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Discussion After the Speeches of Joel Rogers and Carlton
Grenier
QUESTION, Professor King: The states use incentives to get in-
dustry. They also use tax abatements and training programs. They
compete with one another and this, to some extent, plummets the avail-
ability of the tax fix. It also may affect infrastructure. Should there be
any rules that are applicable to what a state can do ala the European
Community ("EC"), for example? The EC gets concerned that too
many concessions are made by certain countries to attract industries.
Should there be any set of rules or standards or a bottom and/or ceil-
ing on what states can do to attract industry and also to create jobs?
Do you want to comment on that, Joel Rogers?
ANSWER, Mr. Rogers: I think it would be great to have such a
code among the United States. That is just the sort of standard on
behavior, including state behavior, that is needed to foreclose destruc-
tive sorts of restructuring. Needless to say, it would be extremely diffi-
cult to do.
QUESTION, Professor King: They put limits on in the EC. The
irony of it is you give concessions on taxes, you reduce your base per
education, and this is a period of education when you want to increase
our skills and our education of techniques.
ANSWER, Mr. Rogers: Sure, in the race to the bottom everyone
loses in the end.
QUESTION, Mr. Russell: This is a question for Carl Grenier.
You were talking particularly about industrial policy as it relates to
Quebec. Although you indicated that Quebec is fairly careful with its
industrial policy, there are those who would argue that Quebec was not
the only jurisdiction in at least North America that has what might be
called a comprehensive industrial policy. There is a lot of talk about
Quebec, Inc., and in that context I am wondering what your thoughts
are on the provisions of Article 2.2 of the Dunkel Draft of the GATT.
That dealt with the ability of subfederal jurisdictions to subsidize their
industry. Under this provision, subfederal jurisdictions, even though
they may make a subsidiary generally available within, may be deemed
to be providing a specific subsidy. I am wondering what Quebec's posi-
tion is on that and does it concern you?
ANSWER, Mr. Grenier: Actually, the word is subnational instead
of subfederal. Yes, we are very worried about this, and I believe the
federal Government is very worried too. For those who would not really
understand this question, it would mean, for instance, that if we had a
program - say a similar program in Quebec or Ontario, and the fed-
eral Government would have the same program, exactly the same with
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the same criteria, and they were subsidizing the same company, the
federal program would be acceptable to the U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment and the provincial programs would not. It poses a problem of
political legitimacy in acting in an industrial policy way. I believe that
is a political time bomb, not only in Quebec, but also in Canada. Un-
fortunately, Canada is probably the only country in the world that
would be really affected negatively with this provision of the draft's
final act because you need to be both a federal country and you need to
be a big exporter of the U.S. to be affected by this and, really, only
Canada fits that bill.
QUESTION, Mr. Russell: Your reading of it is that states in the
U.S. are not as concerned as you are?
ANSWER, Mr. Grenier: Well, as I said before, the states do not
export to the U.S. They do not face the U.S. countervailing duty law.
We do. It would not affect them.
QUESTION, Mr. Fay: Has not there been some improvement on
that?
ANSWER, Mr. Grenier: There have been a lot of discussions, but
we do not have many allies because of the fact that not many other
countries are affected. As you know, Mr. Dunkel has said it is not his
text. You have to agree with everybody else to change something in the
text.
QUESTION, Mr. Russell: The draft, in fact, was driven by the
EC provisions -
ANSWER, Mr. Grenier: It so happens it is a French idea.
QUESTION, Professor King: I have another question for Joel
Rogers. You mentioned an institutional framework. You said there are
dribs and drabs by the states, but you did not elaborate on that. What
was your vision of an institutional framework in terms of institutional-
izing some of the things that states are doing?
ANSWER, Mr. Rogers: Within states, I think you want to move
toward labor market boards (with labor, business, and state representa-
tion on them) having overall responsibility, within a particular labor
market, for promoting upgrading of the right sort. These boards could
also oversee more or less integrated service delivery in those markets.
In any case, you want to run some of that cash through them, so that
they have some currency with which to deal with firms. The boards
should promote dynamic benchmarking of skills standards and training
efforts among firms participating in various industry consortia (the ex-
istence of which should reduce fears of free-riders in private training
provisions), and membership in such consortia should be rewarded with
discounts on training costs and all manner of technical assistance. Es-
sentially, the boards should organize "good" business away from some
of the problems that lead it not to behave optimally (e.g., poaching on
competitors rather than training themselves), and organize business
[Vol. 19:187 1993
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 19 [1993], Iss. , Art. 21
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol19/iss/21
Rogers and Grenier-DISCUSSION
overall to be good (i.e., punish "bad" firms).
Nationally, we need to eliminate- the low wage option. This implies
labor market regulation, and a sensible trade policy. I favor raising
minimum wages, and making unions legal again. Internationally, I
favor international labor standards, with quota penalties on countries
that do not enforce them, and a "social tariff" on trade flows. The lat-
ter would be designed to force a race to the top on international living
standards rather than a race to the bottom. For consumers, the tariff
would largely eliminate, producer cost advantages judged as illegiti-
mate (e.g., deriving from lower absolute labor costs, or looser environ-
mental protection).
However, knowing that we are very far from this sort of scheme, I
would in the meantime encourage much more aggressive use of govern-
ment purchasing, tax, and regulatory power at home to force firms up-
ward to the highest international standards on production. I believe the
states, and the federal government, still have real "hammers" available
to them to change firm behavior. They should be used. Everything in
the system - all taxes, all spending, all regulation - should be used to
encourage high-wage upgrading and discourage low-wage downgrad-
ing. Firms that upgrade should, in effect, be subsidized and everywhere
aided. Firms that do not should be taxed and otherwise harassed.
QUESTION, Mr. Fay: If we are worried about training workers,
why not do it through community colleges. We train professionals and
we give them students loans that run upwards of $150,000. Can we
give bigger loans on the same concept?
ANSWER, Mr. Rogers: You can. Lots of people have suggested
individual training accounts or other such loans. And I certainly think
the community college system is a more reasonable base for improved
vocational training than apprenticeship in firms themselves.
QUESTION, Mr. Fay: If we are spending so little per worker and
Mercedes is spending so much, how are we ever going to build a
Mercedes?
ANSWER, Mr. Rogers: You probably will not.
COMMENT, Mr. Fay: I like your optimism.
COMMENT, Mr. Rogers: Well, as President Reagan used to say,
facts are stupid things. And the stupid facts of the matter are that, in
comparative terms, we spend very little on private training or public
vocational instruction for front-line workers. The government is going
to have to spend more, and so will firms.
QUESTION, Professor King: I have one other question on the
same subject. We have seen the German invasion of South Carolina
with Bavarian Motor Works (BMW) down there. My recollection was
that the reason they picked South Carolina was there were certain
training opportunities presented German style to BMW. We are also
looking at Mercedes examining sites for plants here. Is the context for
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training going to change due to the German invasion? Are we going to
see a lot of other states affected by that or are these just isolated
instances?
ANSWER, Mr. Rogers: One general comment. The German
model depends on extra-firm institutions to a greater degree than the
Japanese model. It is reasonable to expect, then, that the difference
between German firm behavior in the U.S. and behavior in Germany
would be greater than that difference for a Japanese firm. So it is strik-
ing, for example, that Siemens Electronics, which is, obviously, as they
say, in the pecking order of universities, restaurants and cities, a world
class competitor, does not make investments in training in its American
operation on anything like the scale of German ones.
That said, though, I welcome as much of this advanced manufac-
turing investment in the U.S. as possible. We have to learn how to do it
somewhere and I think that it would be useful.
COMMENT, Mr. Crane: I would like to comment on Siemens
and training. Siemens in Canada is extremely active compared to in
Germany. Siemens in Canada is very active in developing and trying to
improve the apprenticeship system. Extremely active. And they have
been shifting some manufacturing activity from the United States into
Canada. Their argument is that there is a higher level of work and of
loyalty in Canada than there is in the United States, i.e. less turnover.
Therefore, an investment in training is more justified in the plans for a
higher level of work loyalty and lower employer rates. So certainly in
the Canadian experience, Siemens has played a leadership role in try-
ing to, at least, in Ontario, totally overhaul the apprenticeship training
in the electrical and electronics industries and create whole new catego-
ries of apprenticeship skills. Their target is to quadruple employment in
manufacturing Canada in this decade.
ANSWER, Mr. Rogers: Glad to hear it. I was only speaking of
the U.S. case. Given what you said about what they said about work
loyalty in the U.S., however, it is of course not inconsistent with what I
said. If firms know that employees will stay in place, allowing the di-
rect capture of benefits from training, or if they know that their com-
petitors are training as much as they - so that even if they run the
risk of their trainee becoming another firm's asset, they stand a recipro-
cal chance of picking up trainees from someone else - they will be
willing to train broadly. If not, not. It is not a matter of culture. It is
economic rationality.
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